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Abstract: 
The political economy of agricultural policies – why certain interventions may be 
preferred by political leaders rather than others – is well recognized. This paper explores a 
perspective previously neglected: the political economy of the production of agricultural 
output data. In developing economies the data on agricultural production are weak. 
Because these data are assembled using competing methods and assumptions, the final 
series are subject to political pressure. This paper draws on debates on the evidence of a 
Green Revolution in India, the arguments on effect of withdrawing fertilizer subsidies 
during Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, and finally the paper presents new data on the 
effect of crop data subsidies in Malawi. The recent agricultural census (2006/2007) 
indicates a maize output of 2.1 million tonnes, compared to the previously widely 
circulated figures of 3.4 million tonnes. The paper suggests that ‘data’ are themselves a 
product of agricultural policies. 
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The Political Economy of Agricultural Statistics: Evidence from 
India, Nigeria and Malawi 
Introduction 
One of the most basic questions in development studies is how to raise the productivity of 
poor rural populations. One straightforward answer has been to provide agricultural inputs and 
thereby increase agricultural yields, and historically, this has been a popular response. Thus 
governments of poor (as well as rich) countries have tended to subsidize agricultural inputs such 
as seeds and fertilizers. The central issue is whether and how these policies work. This has been 
debated fiercely, and the recent scholarly debate on fertilizers and the use of subsidies to provide 
them seems symptomatic of the cyclical nature of development ideas (Easterly, 2009: 416). 
Subsidies were an integral part of the state-led development push in the 1960s and 1970s, but 
were then scaled down as part of a larger trend of cuts in state spending during the structural 
adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s. Now, however, subsidies are back on the 
agenda once again.
1
  
The theoretical justifications for a fertilizer subsidy remain the same: either variations on 
the ‘market failure’ argument as taken from microeconomics, or those taken from the classics of 
development economics, such as the ‘vicious circle of underdevelopment’ (Nurkse: 1953).2 The 
essence of the argument is very similar. There is a potential high return on investment in 
fertilizer, but this potential is not met because of capital shortage. Low initial capital thus results 
in underinvestment in agriculture. In turn, this may provide justification for government 
intervention and/or official development assistance.  
The debate over the merits of state intervention in providing agricultural inputs such as 
fertilizers to increase agricultural yield is often portrayed as bifurcated between those who side 
with Jeffrey Sachs and his ‘big push approach’ and those who share William Easterly’s 
                                                          
1
 For policy prescriptions on how to break the ‘poverty trap’ in Malawi with interventions such as fertilizer subsidy, 
see Conroy, Blackie, Whiteside, Malewezi and Sachs (2006). 
2
 Now frequently referred to as ‘poverty traps’ as in for instance (Collier 2007). 
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scepticism of top–down, aid-financed development schemes. As noted, Easterly proposes that 
these debates are re-occurring in a pendulum-like fashion (Easterly 2009). Academic debates are 
not driven purely by policy agendas and fashions; empirics and evidence do sometimes come 
into play. However, these empirics themselves are at times conflicting.  
This paper focuses on these empirics and their attendant conflicts: what do we know 
about the effects of state intervention in providing agricultural inputs? This question is best 
addressed by looking at the agricultural output data. Not by a technical comparison of inputs on 
one side and outputs on the other, but by acknowledging that the data on output are themselves 
constructions that are subject to political influence.  
Recently, Malawi has taken a central role in this public debate. Many scholars have 
commended the decision of the Malawian government to oppose the World Bank and re-
introduce fertilizer subsidies, and often point to its subsequent success in overcoming food 
shortages since 2005. However, as this paper shows, there remain significant discrepancies in the 
measurement of the real extent of this success.  
The results from the most recent agricultural census, published in 2010, indicate that the 
maize crop output for 2006/2007 was 2.1 million metric tonnes. This compares with the 
previously reported 3.4 million metric tonnes, thus implying that the total output of the main 
food crop in Malawi was only 60 percent of what was previously thought. This remarkable 
discrepancy provides the motivation for the paper: how should we evaluate agricultural politics 
in developing economies? It is argued that in order to get an answer to that question, one has to 
first ask where these data come from and how good they are. Previous debates on the virtue of 
subsidizing fertilizers and the role of evidence in these debates are illuminating. We also know a 
lot about the political economy of policy interventions (Bates 1981). This paper offers a 
perspective on the political economy of data about the agricultural economy. When creating 
datasets the same principle applies: Cui bono?  
For some, the lack of reliable evidence is a problem. For governments however, it also 
provides an opportunity to ensure that the evidence that does exist supports their policies! 
Statisticians are vulnerable to this pressure because the data basis itself is weak, thus making it 
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impossible for any statistician to claim that the data speak for themselves. Any data series 
covering developing countries rests on questionable assumptions, especially those regarding food 
production. A suggested solution to this problem has been the use of randomized trials, thus 
countering what Banerjee calls “the resistance to knowledge” (2007: 16).  
The issue of fertilizer subsidies has been subject to such randomized trials by Duflo et al. 
(2008). Set in Kenya, the study conducted some demonstration experiments in which treatment 
and control plots were randomly selected. Unsurprisingly, it was found that “fertilizer, when 
used in appropriate quantities, is highly profitable” (Duflo et al., 2008: 487). Thus this study 
gives a valuable answer to the debate referred to above, with the central question: is use of 
fertilizer profitable? In turn, the answer to this question can guide us in judging whether a 
fertilizer subsidy is justified or necessary, or even point us to how much one should subsidize.  
These well promoted, randomized laboratory-like studies reveal no understanding of how 
the political dimensions of provision affect agricultural production in the aggregate or how the 
returns to fertilizer are distributed. It is useful to know whether the fertilizer package works or 
not, and to have an idea about the returns to such investments. However, it is argued here that the 
central issue is how the political system will respond to and manage a fertilizer subsidy 
programme. Studying these issues in laboratory-like experiments may misguide scholars and 
policymakers – arguably it is the differences not the similarities between the political economy 
and the laboratories that are most important. This article provides a study of how the statistical 
systems in India, Nigeria and Malawi respond to agricultural input policies. The manner in which 
the governments have manipulated the process shows how messy the real world is – and the 
paper makes the argument that it is precisely these lessons that we need to be most keenly aware 
of when agricultural input subsidies are discussed. 
The Politicization of Agricultural Data: Case Studies 
The argument put forward here is that the state provision of subsidies and inputs is 
embedded in political economies marked by weak evidence across locations but where political 
priorities vary. Given the weakness of the evidence, there is ample room for a negotiation of the 
agricultural data. Pressures from above to ‘cheat’ are strong if politicians need to justify their 
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policies. The causation does not only run from top to bottom. The very existence of subsidies, 
particularly in the form of per capita vouchers, does provide an incentive for the agricultural 
sector to expand spontaneously. It is in the interest of peasants and agricultural extension officers 
to ‘increase’ the numbers of farming households, not only to please superiors, but also because 
the vouchers themselves have a market value. The case studies presented here display these 
different dynamics at work. In the case of India in the early 1960s and 1970s, political pressure 
was applied to ensure that the Green Revolution was visible in aggregate output statistics. In 
Nigeria during the period of structural adjustment, policy choice was confused because of the 
existence of competing datasets regarding trends in agricultural yields. The example from 
Malawi shows how the re-introduction of agricultural subsidies from 2005 onwards created a 
perpetual political demand for high growth rates, which was spontaneously met by peasants who 
oversubscribed to fertilizer vouchers.  
India: Green Revolution 
Discussions of the prospect of a Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa invariably 
make reference to the experience of India and South Asia from the late 1960s (Hunt and Lipton: 
2011).
3
 Their focus is on the potential of replication, and on which lessons from India are 
transferrable to African agricultural economies. One aspect that has not received much attention 
is the importance of agricultural statistics and the politicization that necessarily follows their 
provision. From the case of India, some general lessons can be taken regarding the political 
importance of yield numbers, and in particular, the difficulty of independent monitoring. 
The scholarship and research on agricultural data from India is far more comprehensive 
and sophisticated in comparison with most other developing economies. While data on food 
production from Sub-Saharan Africa are either lacking (for the colonial period) or dismissed as 
too weak and/or unreliable (for the post-colonial period), the issue of trends in Indian agricultural 
production has been the subject of intense research and debate (for both the pre-colonial and 
                                                          
3
 For a basic introduction to the various phenomena under the label Green Revolution, see Vaidyanathan (2010). 
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colonial periods).
4
 This may reflect a higher technocratic competency in India and the relative 
strength of that country’s agricultural economics and statistics disciplines. The higher availability 
of data in India is also due to the relative importance of land taxation in the country, an 
institution that historically has been much weaker in Sub-Saharan Africa. This comparatively 
healthy situation has resulted in vigorous debate, and some aspects and findings from such 
debates will be drawn upon here.  
In an article written for a special issue of the Journal of Development Economics 
concerning the reliability of economic statistics and the data base for development, Srinivasan 
draws on examples from India and stresses that these relatively favourable characteristics still do 
not guarantee reliable data series for agricultural production. Since India’s independence, such 
data series result from a process in which first ”the land revenue authority completely 
enumerates agricultural plots” in all states with the exception of three (1994: 6). This provides a 
basic multiplier needed to aggregate the final estimates. In order to reach annual totals of 
production for different crops, the area devoted to each crop in each season is multiplied with the 
average yields for that crop in the area. In order to determine these important components, ‘eye-
estimation’ or harvest sample surveys are used. “Over time ‘eye-estimation’ has largely been 
replaced by sample survey of plot harvests for many of the crops. Replacement is nearly 
complete for many crops but eye estimation is still the rule for many of the crops” (1994: 6). It is 
also noted that the data from the resulting official series do not match those reported by traders. 
In conclusion, Srinivasan argues that “the coverage and reliability of the data have been 
changing in an unknown fashion over time” (1994: 6). Some of the resulting data series can be 
cross-checked with other data:  
In the fifties there were three estimates of the production of food crops: the official 
estimate based on complete enumeration of area (except for three states) and a 
combination of sample harvests and eye-estimates for yield per unit area; National 
Sample Survey (NSS) estimates based on sample survey for crop area as well as yields; 
and an indirect estimate derived from the NSS surveys of household consumption (1994: 
23).  
 
                                                          
4
 The classic study of colonial output trends was provided by Blyn (1966). For a review of some the debates 
surrounding the data series, see for example Tomlinson (1993, p. 33-91). 
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These three series disagreed over levels and trends, and these discrepancies were 
discussed in official committees. However, neither the sources of disagreement nor the direction 
of bias were agreed upon. Consequently, the final, rather arbitrary decision held that there should 
be only one series, and that this one series should rely entirely on the total enumeration 
multiplied by observations of acreage and yields from samples and eye-estimates. 
In a series of volumes published in the early 1970s, entitled Data Base of Indian 
Economy, the role of political pressure in the provision of final output estimates is more directly 
commented upon.
5
 In a study of agricultural statistics, it was noted that since 1967-68, “there 
seems to have been an attempt on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture to vet the final estimates 
as given by the States before publishing the all India figures” (Srinivasan and Vaidyanathan, 
1972: 49). Furthermore, it was argued that these attempts went beyond any adjustments made 
with the goal of reaching reliable estimates, and were instead made “to arrive at an estimate by 
negotiation on the basis of what are essentially preconceptions as to the impact of increased 
absorption of various inputs including high yielding varieties, is on much shakier ground” 
(Srinivasan and Vaidyanathan, 1972: 49).  
In their conclusion, Srinivasan and Vaidyanathan questioned whether the data series had 
any bearings on the formulation of agricultural policy: “For instance, had the final estimates of 
food grains output in 1970-71 been different by, say, 5 million tonnes in what way the short term 
policy would have been different?” (1972: 55). It seems, however, that causality ran the other 
way. In a section recording the discussion on agricultural statistics it was noted that Minhas and 
Srinivasan “were critical of the manner in which the production estimates forwarded by the 
States were amended by the Ministry of Agriculture for the years 1966-67 to 1969-70 and 
wanted to know if there was any sound basis for doing so”(1972: 62). Responding directly to this 
question, Sarma explained that “there was an underestimation judged from the indirect evidence 
available with the Ministry on a number of related items.” Among these items were data 
                                                          
5
 The initiative to the volume is explained by C. R. Rao in the foreword, who said it was put together after an 
econometric conference on ‘war on poverty’ held in Hyderabad in 1972 where participants “were extremely critical 
of certain official statistics” and it had been argued that “any economic analysis based on such defective data may be 
misleading” (Rao, 1972, foreword). 
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demonstrating an increased usage of improved seeds, fertilizer, irrigation, and improved 
practices (1972: 64-65).  
The debate did not end there. As Baker recounted, the controversy over the Green 
Revolution in India focused not only on the distributional consequences in the rural sector, but 
also on the “contention that the Green Revolution never happened” (1984: 37). One can debate 
whether there really was evidence of a “dramatic shift in trend around the magic year of 1966-
67”,6 but if timing remains an issue, in the long term there is no doubt that the aggregate yields in 
Indian agriculture did eventually increase. The official statistics on land yields do show that they 
have increased, as one would expect, resulting from increased capital and labour inputs to land.
7
  
A revolution would imply a sudden spurt of growth, but if such an event is visible in the 
growth statistics it was the result of official tampering.
8
 Chambers noted that, in hindsight, it was 
a mistake to believe that the high yielding varieties could have caused such dramatic rises in 
output, but that this belief was sustained by misleading statistics. He argued that agricultural 
extension officers were given ambitious targets and “reported these [targets as] achieved when 
the reality lagged far behind”. He also provided sources showing that the official statistics for 
some areas with high-yielding varieties were overstated by 3 to 5 times (1984: 362). This 
indicates that the production of official statistics on output, as established by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, was carried on in such a way as to reflect its own exaggerated statistics on uses of 
inputs. Thus, the Green Revolution was not only overstated in statistics, it was artificially created 
before it really happened. 
                                                          
6
 For a detailed discussion of the fiercely contested rate of growth in the period leading up to this ‘magic year’ see 
Rudra (1982, ch. 11).  
7
 For a view on how the official long term land yield statistics look, see for instance Basu and Maertens (2010, pp. 
596–597).  
8
 One of the more famous revisions of statistics that undermined the label of ‘revolution’ was done by Crafts who 
showed that, contrary to previous, misleading time series, the first industrial revolution in England in the 17
th
 and 
18
th
 century was in fact slow, and not explosive as previously thought (2004). Incidentally, the same logic applies 
for both high yielding varieties and steam engines; the adaptation was slow and the aggregate growth rate will react 
very slowly because of the dominance of the economy where new technology has not yet been adopted. 
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Nigeria: Structural Adjustment 
In 1985 Nigeria agreed to undertake structural adjustment programmes. Important 
components in the package included the removal of fertilizer subsidies and the liberalization of 
agricultural marketing. The former was reversed when it was claimed that fertilizer was too 
expensive and that agricultural growth was falling as a result. In an article called ‘Policy Making 
without Facts’, Mosley describes the conflicting stories about agricultural growth during this 
critical period, with explicit reference to the different datasets (1992).
9
 It was reported that there 
were four sources of data on food crops, but that they frequently showed enormous 
discrepancies. Data were provided by the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), the United States 
Department of Agriculture, the FAO and the Central Bank of Nigeria. Only the first series was 
derived directly from field surveys. The datasets from the Central Bank were arrived at by 
adjusting the estimates from the Office of Statistics with additional information made available 
by the Ministry of Agriculture for food crops, while the data concerning commercial crops were 
scaled up by 30 percent in order to allow for parallel marketing.  
The FAO and USDA series are both indirect estimates which take into account estimated 
trends in consumption and imports, yielding production as a residual. Not being firmly 
based on observed production, they both convey an implausible impression of stability; 
but they may offer a better guide to the long-term trend of production than the field-based 
series (Mosley, 1992: 240).  
 
Mosley also compared the datasets. According to the data approved by the Federal Office 
of Statistics, which were based on field surveys, there was negative growth in food production 
after structural adjustment programmes. The other dataset, approved by the FAO and the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, showed very rapid growth in food production. The policy implications of these 
two different datasets were completely opposite: the first implied that structural adjustment 
policies did not work, while the second implied that they were indeed effective. The problem 
was further compounded by the fact that both conclusions could make economic sense through 
two different interpretations. One could plausibly argue that a liberalization of internal food 
prices, together with less competition from imports, led to a positive supply response. Another 
                                                          
9
 The title is a reference to Stolper’s book on development planning in Nigeria following independence (1966).  
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equally plausible interpretation would be that the removal of fertilizer subsidies caused a 
negative production response. 
Mosley describes how some of the structural adjustment reforms were reversed shortly 
after they were introduced. In both cases, it was data that formed the basis of the decisions that 
were made. Mosley argued that the data from Federal Office of Statistics were most likely to be 
the more reliable, since they were based on field surveys and physical data (1992: 240). Four 
years earlier, in 1988, Collier had examined available datasets on food production in Nigeria. He 
noted that in the 1970s and 1980s “a combination of complex events and weak data” had yielded 
incompatible analyses (1988: 762). In his examination the series based on assumed relationships 
between food production, income and imports was preferred.  
The Nigerian case is instructive in that there was a clear-cut policy choice: to remove or 
keep fertilizer subsidies. In the end, the removal of subsidies was reversed, although the 
government could have chosen to use a different dataset that supported the opposite action. 
According to Mosley the crucial ‘fact’ was that in 1987 it was reported that the utilization of 
fertilizers “in the Agricultural Development Project Areas – the showpiece areas from which 
technology was expected to diffuse to less-favoured regions—had fallen” (1992: 232). This 
example shows how ‘evidence based policy’ may be an illusion; it was still up to the government 
to decide which version of the evidence should take supremacy. 
Malawi: Fertilizer Subsidies 
The current debate over the merits of state intervention – in particular on the use of 
fertilizer subsidies – centers on the case of Malawi and the government’s decision to break with 
the IMF and the World Bank by re-introducing fertilizer subsidies.
 
According to Jeffrey Sachs, 
writing in the New York Times, President Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi “broke old donor-led 
shibboleths by establishing new government programs to get fertilizer and high-yield seeds to 
impoverished peasant farmers who could not afford these inputs. Farm yields soared once 
nitrogen got back into the depleted soils” (Sachs, 2010). It is widely acknowledged that the 
change from recurring famines to more recent relative affluence is due to an increase in land 
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yields which has been helped by the increased use of subsidized agricultural inputs (Lea and 
Hanmer, 2009: 8).
10
 
In Malawi, the success of President Mutharika is intimately linked with this agricultural 
success story. He proposed the fertilizer subsidy programme as part of his larger Malawi 
Economic Growth Strategy during the election campaign in 2004. Indeed, it is thought that this 
contributed significantly to his electoral victory. In 2009, Mutharika was re-elected to the 
Presidency, obtaining 66 percent of the popular vote, and arguably his continued success is due 
in large part to the agricultural focus of his development agenda – an agenda that targets 
smallholders and therefore generates broad support among the electorate (Cherwa et al., 2006).  
This has become even more important politically because Malawi and Mutharika have 
seemingly succeeded in changing the World Bank’s stance on the issue. The 1997 World Bank 
Country Report for Malawi targeted the removal of input subsidies. By contrast, the Bank now 
states on its website that it “strongly supports Malawi’s efforts to improve smallholder 
production. The national input subsidy has made an important contribution to this objective” 
(World Bank web post). 
The impressive growth data reported from Malawi in recent years has been supported by 
crop data collected by the Ministry of Agriculture and published in the Malawi Annual Economic 
Report. These reported crop data were based on the last census, in 1992/1993, and the annual 
projections of agricultural production were built up by using yield and acreage observations from 
agricultural extension officers (Malawi, 2009). A National Census of Agriculture and Livestock 
was undertaken in 2006/2007, but the report was not released until 2010. The census was funded 
by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and was conducted by the 
National Statistical Office (NSO). The delay itself was an issue of concern (Malawi, 2009), and 
when it was finally published, the results were not accepted by the Ministry of Agriculture.
11
 The 
problem was that the census showed remarkably lower figures for the total output of all crops, 
including the prestigious maize crop. Notably, the maize figures reported from the census are 
                                                          
10
 In addition to better weather conditions. 
11
 This information was obtained during interviews conducted at the National Statistical Office, the IMF Office, the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and at the Reserve Bank Malawi in Lilongwe, Malawi in 
November 2010.  
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much closer to national food needs, while the official figures in 2006/2007 would imply that 
either huge stockpiles of maize accumulated around the country or a significant portion of the 
population was getting fat, neither of which are evident. Indeed, the caloric output of the official 
numbers would imply that the average Malawian consumes something in excess of 4000 calories 
a day, compared to the commonly assumed figure of around 1500 to 2000 (personal 
communication IMF, 2010).  
 
Table 1: Census data and Ministry of Agriculture data compared, 2006/2007 crop estimates 
(metric tonnes) 
 
Crop Census data Ministry of Agriculture data 
Maize 2,116,650 3,444,655 
Rice 68,053 113,166 
Sorghum 13,256 63,698 
Millet 7,609 32,251 
Cassava 407,167 3,285,127 
Sweet potato 247,000 (1) 2,307,354 
Pulses etc. 250,000 (2) 415,551 (3) 
 
(1) Figure cited in NACAL p xii; note that tables 3.8 and 3.9 show identical figures for sweet potato and groundnuts, so there is 
an error somewhere. 
(2) Figure cited in NACAL pg. xii for beans, pulses, and groundnuts. 
(3) Figure in MEPD report for pulses alone. 
 
When the average yield figures from the two reports are compared, they show only a 
marginal discrepancy. The significant difference derives from how the data are aggregated. The 
issue of disagreement is the number of agricultural households, where the Ministry of 
Agriculture used a figure nearly 1 million higher than that used by the census. Statistical officers 
diplomatically stated that this may have been due to the different definitions of the household 
being employed (NSO, personal communication, 2010). In other circles it was hinted that some 
farmers might have been invented in some cases in order to qualify for subsidies (NORAD, IMF 
personal communication, 2010).  
Although there is no direct evidence of tampering, the indications are strong, as were the 
incentives. The President and the Ministry desired good, consistent performance in order to keep 
the electorate convinced of the continued success of the agricultural development strategy. 
Perhaps more importantly, they needed to be able to convince donors that the fertilizer and seed 
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programmes were working, thus ensuring that financial support would be forthcoming. The 
fertilizer subsidy programme totalled 4.6 percent of GDP in 2008/2009, or approximately one-
third of the aid inflows (Lea and Hanmer, 2009). It was also in the interest of peasants and 
agricultural extension officers to ‘increase’ the numbers of farming households, not only to 
please superiors, but also because the vouchers themselves have a market value. There is some 
evidence and growing concern that the vouchers are not reaching the right recipients, and that 
officials and local authorities are able to profit from them (Africa Research Institute, 2007; 
International Food Policy Research Institute, 2009). These worries aside, the situation of 
agricultural data in Malawi fits into an established pattern of strong executive pressure on 
statistical authorities to get the particular data that the leadership needs, where the motivation is 
not to monitor the economy, but to affirm success (personal communication, Malawi Reserve 
Bank, NSO). 
Discussion  
The political economy of agricultural policies—why certain interventions may be 
preferred by political leaders rather than others—is well recognized. This paper explores a 
perspective previously neglected: the political economy of the production of agricultural output 
data. In developing economies the data on agricultural production are weak. Because these data 
are assembled using competing methods and assumptions, the final series are subject to political 
pressure. 
In his classic work, Bates argued that governments prefer to tax the agricultural sector 
and then selectively subsidize it by providing inputs to production, in order to ensure that they 
able to manipulate political support (1981). It is has also been argued convincingly by Bates and 
others that small-scale peasants find it more difficult to mobilize politically, and therefore they 
tend to be marginalised in policy making, resulting in what has been called ‘urban bias’ (Lipton, 
1977). This paper has examined these questions from a different perspective: what is the political 
economy of agricultural data?  
The investigation tends to support the general argument that agricultural policies fit into 
patron–client relationships, and that politicians, local authorities and agricultural extension 
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officers will not always act in a technocratic manner, but rather in accordance with what is 
politically beneficial. It also suggests a significant revision: if peasants are not politically 
important, why are governments concerned with the statistics of agricultural performance? In the 
Indian and Malawian cases there is evidence that governments went to considerable lengths to 
‘prove’ that the policies were working. In the Nigerian case, the implications are less clear. It 
does indicate, however, that policymakers did react politically and even attempted to justify that 
reaction with reference to data on agricultural production. In a distorted way the ‘feedback 
mechanism’ does work. When the information in the mechanism does not fit the aims of political 
leaders, it is occasionally tampered with, while at other times there is conflicting information that 
may support different conclusions, and political leaders can choose which information they will 
act upon. 
This study of the role of evidence in agricultural policy formulation has important 
implications for the potential Green Revolutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. The catchphrase 
‘evidence based policy’ assumes that evidence and policy are somehow independent. To the 
contrary, this study has shown how evidence is deeply embedded in policy structures. Failure to 
understand that data are social products and that the relations of power condition the production 
of them may lead researchers and donors to place undue confidence in datasets (Herring, 2001: 
151). Thus, a policy recommendation is to use qualitative methods and ethnographers to study 
not only how agricultural polices affect agricultural producers, but also how the different 
collection methods affect what kind of data are collected.
12
 Problems related to the collection of 
reliable data exist and may be challenging. However, this does not mean we can sidestep the 
issue. The ‘data’ are themselves a product of agricultural policies and research employing mixed 
methods is required to meet this challenge. 
                                                          
12
 For instance, Dorward and Chirwa (2010) found that when agricultural extension officers spend more time with 
producers the resulting yield estimates are biased upwards. 
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